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Spooky fiddling: The CIA playbook and the overthrow of Whitlam | Killexams.com Resources

In a telephone dialog between Kissinger and Nixon following the 1973 militia coup d’état in Chile, the President requested if “our hand” confirmed within the overthrow and death of the democratically elected President Allende. Kissinger defined that “we didn’t do it”, when it comes to direct participation within the militia actions. “I suggest we helped them”, Kissinger persisted, “[redacted words] created the conditions as excellent as feasible.”

source: Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File

As outlined in outdated articles in this series, following its meeting in June 1974 on the complications caused by the Whitlam government, the us State branch had dominated out any “spooky fiddling” in Australia.

On Kissinger’s return, youngsters, his determination to flow the relationship into the USA countrywide safety Council (NSC)’s jurisdiction signalled that a better strategy had been adopted. The valuable Intelligence agency (CIA) could be involved.

In any operation in Australia, the CIA would have to operate with a really gentle contact. As suggested within the best ‘good Secret’ paragraph in a listing of meeting with the Defence Secretary in February 1975, Ambassador Marshall green turned into naturally aware about the dangers involved:

“Secretary Schlesinger expressed the opinion that U.S. installations can be allowed to remain in Australia so long as Whitlam is in charge. eco-friendly agreed, with two exceptions: (1) If Minister Cairns ever grew to be head of the Labor celebration, the U.S. would discover it tricky to stay; (2) if latest investigations within the U.S. became linked with Australia, the ensuing storm could shorten our reside.”

The “current investigations” had been clearly those being undertaken through the Senate’s Church Committee into covert movements undertaken by using the CIA in different nations.

An additional constraint turned into that Australia turned into a member of 5 Eyes, at the moment known because the UKUSA contract. This become a really vast intelligence sharing agreement between Anglophone international locations. The community’s protocols required that any overseas intelligence officer operating in Australia may still be ‘declared’ and no covert operation may still be set up towards the host executive.

even so, given that these protocols had been generally devised by means of the CIA, they may additionally had been honoured by using that agency as a good deal in the breach as in the observance.

Labor came to vigour in 1972 deeply suspicious of ASIO, which under Charles Spry had developed a detailed relationship with the CIA. They believed, justifiably, that ASIO had been used by conservative governments to spy on left wingers like Cairns and systematically undermine the celebration. Justice Hope, who headed a Royal fee into the safety services based by using Whitlam in 1973, validated that ASIO become “politically biased” and “the whole equipment turned into radically directed to the left wing of politics”.

James Angleton, the CIA’s Director of Counter-intelligence, became suspicious concerning the new Labor executive from the very beginning. Intelligence sharing was tremendously decreased following Whitlam’s letter to Nixon in December 1972. The view in the CIA changed into that “the Australians might as smartly be viewed as North Vietnamese collaborators”.

lawyer ordinary Murphy’s March 1993 ‘raid’ on ASIO’s headquarters added fuel to the flames. in line with counsel handed to him by using a faction of anti-Whitlam bloodless conflict warriors in ASIO, Angleton instructed the CIA station chief in Canberra, John Walker, to ask ASIO head Peter Barbour to state publicly that Whitlam had lied to Parliament about the raid. The goal of this fantastic intervention was to drive the major Minister to resign. Barbour effectively refused.

The prime Minister’s attitude to the safety agencies hardened because the govt moved to the left after the may additionally 1974 election. In July, Whitlam instructed Barbour to cease collaboration between ASIO and the CIA. As Blaxland wrote: “Barbour felt this might be hazardous to the nation, inflicting hurt to critical intelligence links”. He persuaded Whitlam to permit him to wind the connection returned to a lower degree.

Following the NSC’s assumption of jurisdiction over the relationship with Australia after August 1974, outlined in part 2 of this sequence, what position would the CIA have performed? In his booklet CIA Diary, Philip Agee, a young CIA officer who served in Ecuador and later went rogue, reveals details of the CIA playbook, a few of which might be relevant in the Australian context. The goal, if this playbook changed into adopted, would have been to destabilise the government whereas at the same time removing the probability of Cairns, the american citizens’ real bête noire, fitting prime minister.

Is there evidence that this happened? As suggested below, a CIA covert action telephone may additionally were lively in Australia at this time.

Jim Cairns was driving excessive when he grew to be Treasurer in December 1974, however presently afterwards his decline begun. His relationship along with his inner most secretary, Junie Morosi – a relationship which appeared genuine and mutual – grew to become a magnet for the regular media and become a factor in the executive’s declining popularity.

One seemingly avenue for soiled hints relates to a letter Cairns supposedly despatched to George Harris, a Melbourne dentist, inviting Harris to determine possible sources for a foreign loan, with a finder’s payment of two.5 per cent. Cairns at all times vehemently denied signing the letter. His denial changed into credible. As Treasurer, he agreed along with his branch’s strictures related to unconventional loan raising. He had consistently adverse paying any fee for such transactions. As acting leading Minister in January, he had revoked Rex Connor’s commission to are looking for a huge remote places personal loan (on his return, Whitlam reinstated it).

nonetheless, Cairns was compelled to resign for misleading Parliament. The purported letter, a scratchy photocopy, turned into leaked to the Murdoch press. was it specific? What become its supply?

perhaps of most interest in exploring this question is that the CIA, in reporting Cairns’ downfall, mentioned in its classified national Intelligence every day that “one of the proof had been fabricated”.

As mentioned in part 1, Rex Connor, was also disregarded for deceptive Parliament. A reporter from the Melbourne Herald tracked down Tirath Khemlani, Connor’s intermediary, and posted a entrance-web page story contradicting Connor’s assurances that he had stopped actively in search of foreign borrowings. Connor duly resigned. Fraser then seized on this ‘reprehensible circumstance’ and introduced he would block provide.

a week later, his briefcase bulging with papers and his mouth with potato crisps, Khemlani descended on Australia, reputedly intent on involving the leading Minister in the affair. What was his cause? Dishing the dirt on an incredible client is not often a career enhancing move for executives within the economic sector. Did funds exchange fingers? The journalist worried talked about that Khemlani “didn't ask for cash and nor became he paid anything”. a variety of unconfirmed allegations, youngsters, include that Khemlani “was rumoured to be in the pay of the CIA”.

There is no proof of CIA intervention.  And yet, Cairns’ fall from grace was comprehensive and revelations about Connor had brought about Fraser to block deliver. If we pose the query of cui bono – the USA NSC can be high on the record.

In September 1975, Whitlam disregarded ASIO head Peter Barbour, who became no longer ordinary with the CIA. The cold warfare warriors inside ASIO had compiled a file on Barbour’s practice of visiting in company together with his “pleasing Eurasian secretary”. With staggering chutzpah, the pinnacle of ASIO’s Canberra workplace, Colin Brown, who changed into conducting an affair with the spouse of the CIA’s John Walker, instructed the Hope commission his boss’s visiting addiction changed into “unwell-recommended and indiscreet”.

Barbour’s dismissal left a spot at the suitable of ASIO just when the prime Minister might have benefited from a person who had his again. Whitlam became about to wreck cover in what was without doubt a mission to find out the reality about CIA activities in Australia.

The leading Minister’s questions to overseas Affairs and Defence revealed that a senior CIA officer, Richard Stallings, had been operating undeclared in Australia. In 1966-70, Stallings had been in charge of establishing Pine hole for the CIA. more these days, he had been working at a CIA base at Willunga in the Adelaide Hills, the place his former deputy at Pine hole, Victor Marchetti, informed journalists he changed into employed by means of the company’s covert motion division.

Whitlam changed into furious. Tange had deceived him over the intention of Pine gap, which, being a CIA installing, became obviously used primarily for espionage in opposition t the Soviet Union. additionally, against all of the diplomatic protocols for five Eyes countries, the CIA had been operating undeclared officers in Australia.

Having discovered that Stallings had rented a condominium from the leader of the countrywide nation party, Doug Anthony, Whitlam, as James Curran states, “threw warning to the wind” in a speech on 2 November. “in any case the self-handle he had proven in previous years on the U.S. amenities, in any case the enterprise assurances he had given about them to American counterparts … he at last succumbed to temptation.” Whitlam accused his political opponents of “being subsidised by using the CIA”.

This observation aroused fire and fury on either side of the Pacific. The State branch issued a denial that Stallings became employed by the CIA while its Director, invoice Colby, denied involvement in Australian politics. Yet Whitlam had found out one of the actuality about Pine hole and changed into because of answer a question on observe from Anthony on its ownership and services in Parliament on the afternoon of Martinmas.

The NSC would have had two overriding concerns. the primary turned into that Whitlam would reveal the identities of CIA officers in Australia and that the Pine hole facility become an espionage operation run by the CIA. The second become that Whitlam would formally deliver the requisite one-12 months be aware that the agreement to host Pine hole would no longer be renewed when it expired on 9 December. Marchetti talked about later that the chance to close the power “led to apoplexy within the White house. penalties were inevitable … a kind of Chile turned into set in motion.”

despite the fact Kissinger stood down as country wide security Adviser on 3 November, as Secretary of State he remained a senior member of NSC and would still had been directing this operation. What would he have performed? however Cairns had gone, Whitlam may no longer be relied on to look after Pine gap. The optimum influence changed into for the Labor government to head. but, to return to the opening passage about Chile, it was elementary that “our hand” did not show in its loss of life. Whitlam changed into now main in the opinion polls. The Governor-time-honored stated to the Palace that Whitlam became exuberant in early November, convinced Fraser would back down. If he have been to be disregarded and there changed into any trace of a Chile-like coup in Australia, Whitlam may campaign at the subsequent election on an anti-American interference ticket and somewhat probably regain office. that could be fatal for the amenities.

Following Whitlam’s speech, the American response took just about every week to arrive. It become cautiously considered. Kissinger turned to Ted Shackley, Chief of the CIA East Asia Division, who had been deeply involved in the Chile operation and whose name may additionally smartly be the redacted item on the head of this piece. On eight November, Shackley despatched a demarche – a personal agency to agency signal – to ASIO. He said he couldn't see how the issues raised via Whitlam could do other than “blow the lid off those installations in Australia the place the individuals worried have been working and which are a must have to each of our services and nations, above all the installing at Alice Springs”. unless the issues can be solved, he “could not see how our at the same time really useful relationships are going to continue. The CIA does not flippantly adopt this angle.”

The cable changed into devilishly clever. It reeks of Henry Kissinger. If it fell into Whitlam’s hands, which became not intended, it allows for for the interpretation that Pine gap turned into a joint facility and that only intelligence sharing changed into being endangered, leaving numerous room in an election crusade for plausible deniability that ANZUS was under possibility. in spite of this, its dog whistling interpretation for the cognoscenti, which amounts to an ultimatum, is much more menacing. Blaxland, in his history of ASIO, states that according to one exam, “the Shackley cable become probably the most serious word handed to Australian authorities within the history of bilateral family members between Australia and the U.S.”.

Whitlam changed into shown the cable and changed into angry but undeterred. He read out to Tange his proposed reply to the Parliamentary query. The Defence Secretary, who become aghast, had absolutely picked up the subliminal message in Shackley’s cable that may well were supposed for him. He informed the top Minister’s workforce that the disclosure that Pine gap was a CIA facility for gathering right secret intelligence could imply the conclusion of the alliance. For that intent, he believed it constituted “the gravest chance to the nation’s safety there has ever been”.

Tange become obviously at the end of his tether. It appears doubtless from the State department assembly in June 1974 that the american citizens considered him nearly as an agent of impact. In 1977, Andrew Hay, a senior Coalition staffer who changed into deeply worried in investigating the loans affair, instructed Toohey “Tange was working at the back of the scenes to look the conclusion of the Whitlam govt”. in that case, he would without doubt have advised Malcolm Fraser, his former Minister on the time Pine gap was established, of the sign from Fairfax, Virginia.

it is often suggested that the CIA’s ultimatum to ASIO performed no half within the Governor-widely wide-spread’s thinking because there isn't any facts that he turned into briefed on the American concerns. here is fallacious. John Farrands, the chief Defence Scientist, changed into the senior Australian reliable most carefully associated with Pine gap. In 1977, on the groundwork he would deny the story if it ever emerged, Farrands instructed Brian Toohey about a call he made to Kerr on 8 November, the day the CIA’s demarche arrived. On the groundwork of Tange’s guidelines, Farrands advised the Governor-established of the safety considerations about Whitlam. The Defence Minister, bill Morrison, who become aware of the briefing, later advised a journalist, “I don’t feel [the briefing] turned into decisive, however I think it reinforced [Kerr’s] position”.

The CIA would not have approached Kerr at once. apart from the dangers, they have been now not most excellent positioned to have an impact on him. to come back to the CIA playbook, as Agee data a few destabilisation campaign in Jamaica “no major political action of that nature would had been undertaken devoid of the approval, and doubtless the participation, of the British. in any case, special guidelines observe for CIA operations in Commonwealth countries …”

study the different articles during this series:

“shame Fraser, disgrace”: The overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam

Stress testing the united states alliance: Whitlam and the secrets of Pine hole

cold warfare imperatives: Whitlam and the us national safety Council